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I. INTRODUCTION
Fifty years ago, in Terry v. Ohio,1 the Supreme Court recognized that the 
practice of stopping individuals for questioning and conducting frisks for weapons 
ZDV³DPDMRUVRXUFHRIIULFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHSROLFHDQGPLQRULW\JURXSV´2 Despite 
DFNQRZOHGJLQJWKDWDIULVNUHSUHVHQWV³DVHULRXVLQWUXVLRQXSRQWKHVDQFWLW\RIWKH
person, which may inflict great LQGLJQLW\DQGDURXVHVWURQJUHVHQWPHQW´3 the Court 
held that officers could conduct them even in the absence of probable cause to 
believe that the individual was armed and dangerous.4 Furthermore, the Court also 
DIILUPHGWKDW³LQDSSURSULDWHFLUFXPVWDQFes and in an appropriate manner[, police 
may] approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior 
HYHQ WKRXJK WKHUH LV QR SUREDEOH FDXVH WRPDNH DQ DUUHVW´5 Experience in the 
years since Terry was decided demonstrates that stops and frisks continue to foster 
negative relationships between communities of color and the police, leading many 
in these communities to distrust the police and to question their legitimacy.
In this Essay, I will use lessons from social psychology as a lens to explain 
why Terry and its progeny were destined to create unjustified racial disparities in 
SROLFLQJUHJDUGOHVVRIRIILFHUV¶FRQVFLRXVUDFLDOPRWLYDWLRQV,ZLOOIRFXVRQSROLFH
interactions with Black individuals, since the social psychological literature upon 
which I rely primarily studies relationships with Black people.
This Essay proceeds in three parts.  Part I introduces two lessons from the 
field of social psychology that are of relevance to police-public interactions.  First, 
unconscious racial biases linking Black individuals with criminality and White 
individuals with innocence create the risk that officers will be more likely to judge 
the ambiguous behaviors of Blacks as suspicious while ignoring or not even 
noticing the identical ambiguous behaviors of Whites.  As a result, Blacks are 
more likely than Whites to be stopped by the police.  Second, during the 
interaction that results, another psychological process known as racial anxiety can 
enable troubling racial disparities in whether a frisk will occur or force will be 
used.
Part II exposes how the Terry doctrine facilitates the influence of implicit 
racial bias and racial anxiety on behaviors and judgments, leading to unjustified 
racial disparities in police stop and frisk practices.  Part III concludes that these 
disparities in stops and frisks are inevitable, and that the only way to prevent them 
is to eliminate the practice.

1 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
2 Id. at 14 n.11 (citation omitted).
3 Id. at 17.
4 Id. at 27.
5 Id. at 22.
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II. IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS AND RACIAL ANXIETY
Stops and frisks occur in two stages.  The first is the initial judgment of 
suspicion that results in the stop and the second is the interaction that occurs when 
officers investigate their suspicions and potentially conduct a frisk for weapons.  
While there are instances when police deliberately stop and frisk without 
suspicion²either because of individualized animus, or because of their role in 
ZKDW 3URIHVVRU 7UDFH\0HDUHV GHVFULEHV DV D ³SURJUDP´ RI VWRS TXHVWLRQ DQG
frisk6²this Essay assumes that officers are acting in good faith.  This part reveals 
why, even assuming good faith, it is inevitable that Terry stops and frisks will 
UHVXOW LQ XQMXVWLILHG UDFLDO GLVSDULWLHV UHJDUGOHVV RI RIILFHUV¶ FRQVFLRXV UDFLDO
motivations even when Black and White individuals are acting identically.
A. Judgments of Suspicion: The Influence of Implicit Racial Bias7
Research in the field of social psychology over the past four decades 
repeatedly demonstrates that most individuals of all races have implicit, i.e. 
unconscious, racial biases linking Blacks with criminality and Whites with 
innocence.  These associations can lead to systematic and predictable judgment 
errors concerning who is and is not suspicious, a phenomenon Phillip Atiba Goff 
DQG , KDYH SUHYLRXVO\ WHUPHG ³WKH VXVSLFLRQ KHXULVWLF´8 People possess these 
unconscious associations even if these associations conflict with their consciously 
and genuinely held beliefs.  However, these implicit biases can negatively and 
unconsciously influence judgments of and behaviors towards Blacks, and 
positively influence judgments of and behaviors towards Whites in ways that 
people are unaware of and thus, largely unable to control. Since social 
psychologists have most frequently studied biases affecting judgments of 
individuals who appear either Black or White, this section centers on those biases
and their affects.9 In the policing context, implicit biases can cause officers to 
unintentionally judge Black civilians as more suspicious than White civilians, even 
when these officers are consciously egalitarian, reject racial profiling, and are 
Black themselves.  Some effects of implicit racial biases that are relevant to 

6 Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-and-
Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 165±66 (2015).
7 For an in-depth analysis of the discussion contained in this subpart, see L. Song 
Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2089 (2011) 
[hereinafter Richardson, Arrest Efficiency].
8 See L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and the Suspicion Heuristic, 98 
IOWA L. REV. 293 (2012).
9 The social psychological study of implicit racial bias of other groups is growing.  See, e.g.,
Jerry Kang et al., Are Ideal Litigators White?  Measuring the Myth of Colorblindness, 7 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 886 (2010) (finding implicit bias against Asian lawyers); Irene V. Blair et al., 
Assessment of Biases Against Latinos and African Americans Among Primary Care Providers and 
Community Members, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 92 (2013).
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making judgments of suspicion are discussed next.
1. Increased Scrutiny
Typically, racial profiling refers to the conscious practice of targeting people 
for investigation of crime based on race.10 However, implicit racial biases can also 
cause people to focus their attention on Blacks, albeit automatically and 
unconsciously.11 This unconscious racial profiling is attributed to the fact that 
individuals have immediate threat reactions towards Black men.12 Indeed, brain 
scans reveal that the amygdala, a section of the brain associated with fear, responds 
more when people view Black male faces as opposed to White male faces.13 As I 
have observed in other work, this attentional bias is correlated not with conscious 
racial attitudes, but rather, with how strongly the perceiver unconsciously 
associates Blacks with danger.14 Attentional bias affects both civilians and police 
officers.  In one study demonstrating the existence of attentional bias amongst 
officers, researchers found that unconscious biases associating Blacks with 
GDQJHURXVQHVV FDXVHG RIILFHUV¶ DWWHQWLRQ WR EH GUDZQ WR%ODFN IDFHV RYHU:KLWH
faces.15 Additionally, once their attention was captured, Black faces held their 
attention longer than White faces did.16 This study reveals that racial profiling can 
occur unconsciously.  As I discuss next, once attention is captured, implicit bias 
can also influence how ambiguous behaviors are interpreted.
2. Biased Evaluations of Ambiguous Behaviors
Negative stereotypes associating Blacks with criminality and danger can 
cause people of all races, including Blacks, to evaluate ambiguous behaviors as 
more threatening and suspicious when engaged in by Black individuals versus 
White individuals.  Numerous studies demonstrate this effect.  In one study, for 

10 See, e.g., HOUS. POLICE DEP¶T, RACIAL PROFILING, http://www.houstontx.gov/police/racial
prof.htm [https://perma.cc/4TKZ-WZ2T] (last visited Oct. 12, 2017); DALL. CTY. SHERIFF¶S DEP¶T,
DEFINITIONS, http://www.dallascounty.org/department/sheriff/definitions.php [https://perma.cc/W7
CX-D35F] (last visited Oct. 12, 2017).
11 Sophie Trawalter et al., Attending to Threat: Race-Based Patterns of Selective Attention, 44 
J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1322, 1326±27 (2008) [hereinafter Trawalter et al., Attending to 
Threat]; Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 881, 883, 885±87 (2004) [hereinafter Eberhardt et al., Seeing 
Black].
12 Trawalter et al., Attending to Threat, supra note 11, at 1322.
13 See, e.g., Matthew D. Lieberman et al., An fMRI Investigation of Race-Related Amygdala 
Activity in African-American and Caucasian-American Individuals, 8 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 720, 
721 (2005).
14 See Richardson, Arrest Efficiency, supra note 7, at 2045.
15 Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black, supra note 11, at 886±87.
16 Id.
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instance, Black and White school age children rated an ambiguous bump in the 
hallway as more aggressive when performed by a Black student versus a White 
student.17 In another, an ambiguous shove was deemed more violent and 
dangerous when engaged in by a Black man versus a White man.18 Unconscious 
UDFLDOELDVHVFDQHYHQLQIOXHQFHKRZSHRSOHUHDGDQRWKHU¶VIDFLDOH[SUHVVLRQVZLWK
identical expressions being evaluated as more hostile on a Black face than on a 
White face.19
Police officers are not immune from the influence of implicit racial biases on 
their perceptions.  For instance, the unconscious association between Blacks and 
crime influences how quickly officers identify weapons.  In computer simulations, 
officers are quicker to determine that individuals are armed when they are Black as 
opposed to White.20 Researchers conclude that this occurs because it takes less 
time for the mind to process information that is congruent with racial stereotypes.21
Thus, officers require less time to accurately determine that a Black individual is 
armed and more time to accurately determine that a White individual is armed, 
since this latter circumstance is not consistent with existing cultural stereotypes.22
In sum, the study of implicit bias demonstrates that race influences who will 
capture attention and, once attention is captured, how ambiguous behaviors are 
evaluated.  These biases increase the likelihood that Blacks will be viewed with 
more suspicion than Whites even when they are similarly situated and engaged in 
identical behaviors.  In fact, since Whites are automatically and unconsciously 
linked with positive, law-abiding behavior rather than with violence and 
criminality,23 it is more difficult for people to interpret their ambiguous behaviors 
as indicative of danger and suspicion.24 Because these effects are unconscious, 
people will not realize that race impacted their perceptions and judgments.

17 H. Andrew Sagar & Janet Ward Schofield, Racial and Behavioral Cues in Black and White 
Children’s Perceptions of Ambiguously Aggressive Acts, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 
593±95 (1980).  The subjects included both Black and White individuals.
18 Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup Violence: 
Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 590 
(1976).
19 Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Facing Prejudice: Implicit Prejudice and the 
Perception of Facial Threat, 14 PSYCHOL. SCI. 640, 640±43 (2003).
20 Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in the 
Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006, 1013±15 (2007) [hereinafter Correll et 
al., Across the Thin Blue Line].  See also Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using 
Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1314, 1317, 1325 (2002) [hereinafter Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma].
21 Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line, supra note 20, at 1015.
22 Id. at 1020.
23 Robert J. Smith et al., Implicit White Favoritism in the Criminal Justice System, 66 ALA. L.
REV. 871, 898, 922 (2015).
24 Id. at 898.
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Additionally, as the studies reveal, police officers are not immune from 
implicit racial biases.  In fact, there is evidence that officers who work in urban, 
majority-minority neighborhoods are more influenced by implicit racial biases than 
officers who do not work in these neighborhoods.25 Thus, it is reasonable to 
believe that officers will unconsciously subject Blacks to more scrutiny than 
similarly situated Whites and once their attention is captured, that they will 
conclude that the ambiguous behaviors they observe are suspicious enough to 
warrant a Terry stop.
B. Interactions: The Influence of Racial Anxiety
Studies of interracial interactions reveal that both White and Black individuals 
experience anxiety during interracial interactions.26 This section focuses on 
interactions between Black and White individuals since the studies of racial 
anxiety center on these interactions.27 For Whites, the concern during these 
interactions is that they will be evaluated as racist by their Black interaction 
partner,28 and for Blacks, the concern is that their White interaction partner will 
treat them in a racially discriminatory way.29
Racial anxiety has cognitive and physiological effects.30 It can cause 
individuals involved in interracial interactions to feel self-conscious,31 and to 
become hyper-vigilant,32 as they attempt to discern whether they are behaving in 

25 Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line, supra note 20, at 1020.
26 For an extended discussion of racial anxiety, see Rachel D. Godsil & L. Song Richardson, 
Racial Anxiety, 102 IOWA L. REV. 2235 (2017).
27 See Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Lay Theories About White Racists: What 
Constitutes Racism (and What Doesn’t), 9 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 117, 119 (2006).
28 Jennifer A. Richeson & J. Nicole Shelton, Stereotype Threat in Interracial Interactions, in
STEREOTYPE THREAT: THEORY, PROCESS, AND APPLICATION 231, 236±37 (Michael Inzlicht & Toni 
Schmader eds., 2012) [hereinafter Richeson & Shelton, Stereotype Threat]; Sophie Trawalter, 
Jennifer A. Richeson & J. Nicole Shelton, Predicting Behavior During Interracial Interactions: A 
Stress and Coping Approach, 13 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 243, 249 (2009) [hereinafter 
Trawalter et al., Predicting Behavior].
29 Rodolfo Mendoza-Denton et al., Sensitivity to Status-Based Rejection: Implications for 
African American Students’ College Experience, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 896, 896 
(2002); J. Nicole Shelton, Interpersonal Concerns in Social Encounters Between Majority and 
Minority Group Members, 6 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 171, 171 (2003) [hereinafter
Shelton, Interpersonal Concerns]; J. Nicole Shelton & Jennifer A. Richeson, Interracial Interactions: 
A Relational Approach, in 38 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 121, 127±31 (Mark 
Zanna ed., 2006).
30 See Richeson & Shelton, Stereotype Threat, supra note 28, at 236±37.
31 Derek R. Avery et al., It Does Not Have to Be Uncomfortable: The Role of Behavioral 
Scripts in Black-White Interracial Interactions, 94 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1382, 1383 (2009).
32 Jennifer A. Richeson & J. Nicole Shelton, Negotiating Interracial Interactions: Costs, 
Consequences, and Possibilities, 16 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 316, 318±19 (2007); 
Richeson & Shelton, Stereotype Threat, supra note 28, at 236±37.
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ways that will be perceived as racist or whether they are being treated in a racially 
discriminatory manner.33 As individuals become increasingly uncomfortable 
during the interracial contact, their behaviors beFRPH³PRUH ULJLGDQG OHVVZDUP
DQGIULHQGO\WKDQ>WKH\@ZRXOGEHLQDQRQWKUHDWHQLQJFRQWH[W´34
Additionally, the stress of racial anxiety is associated with a variety of 
physiological responses including sweating, increased heart rate, facial twitches,35
fidgeting,36 and avoiding eye contact.37 These responses can make each party to an 
interaction appear unfriendly and uncomfortable.  Thus, racial anxiety causes 
interracial interactions to be awkward and unpleasant for both parties.38
There is evidence that police and Black individuals experience racial anxiety 
during their interactions.  The experience of racial anxiety can negatively influence 
the interaction in ways that increase the potential for a frisk and the use of force.  
For the police, racial anxiety is experienced as the worry that they will be 
perceived as racist by the civilians they encounter.39 This concern can influence 
officers, regardless of their race,40 affecting their perceptions and judgments as 
well as how safe they feel during an interaction.  For instance, if officers believe 
that an individual views them as racist, officers will also likely assume that the 
individual will not respect their authority or grant them any legitimacy.  This 
assumption increases the likelihood that officers will feel unsafe.  One study 
provides evidence of this.  Researchers found that when officers believed that 
civilians did not respect them and did not view them as legitimate, officers 
experienced concerns that interactions with these civilians would be more
dangerous than interactions with civilians who they believed respected their 

33 Mary C. Murphy & Valerie Jones Taylor, The Role of Situational Cues in Signaling and 
Maintaining Stereotype Threat, in STEREOTYPE THREAT: THEORY, PROCESS, AND APPLICATION 17, 18±
19, 24 (Michael Inzlicht & Toni Schmader eds., 2012); Richeson & Shelton, Stereotype Threat, supra 
note 28, at 232±34.
34 Richeson & Shelton, Stereotype Threat, supra note 28, at 237±38.
35 Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Imaging Race, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 181, 182 (2005).
36 Shelton, Interpersonal Concerns, supra note 29, at 179.  See also Trawalter et al., 
Predicting Behavior, supra note 28, at 244.
37 Trawalter et al., Predicting Behavior, supra note 28, at 252, 256.
38 Id. at 243, 263 n.3.
39 PHILLIP ATIBA GOFF ET AL., PROTECTING EQUITY: THE CONSORTIUM FOR POLICE LEADERSHIP 
IN EQUITY REPORT ON THE SAN JOSE POLICE DEPARTMENT 1 (2013) [hereinafter GOFF ET AL.,
PROTECTING EQUITY].
40 See generally Gene Demby, Does Having More Black Officers Reduce Police Violence?,
NPR CODE SWITCH: RACE AND IDENTITY, REMIXED (Feb. 4, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://www.npr.org
/sections/codeswitch/2017/02/04/513218656/does-having-more-black-officers-reduce-police-
violence [https://perma.cc/WJG6-KQK9].  See also GOFF ET AL., PROTECTING EQUITY, supra note 39, 
at 4±5. But see Jacinta M. Gau & Rod K. Brunson, Procedural Justice and Order Maintenance 
Policing: A Study of Inner-City Young Men’s Perceptions of Police Legitimacy, 27 JUST. Q. 255, 270 
QRWLQJWKDW³EODFNVWXG\SDUWLFLSDQWVUHSRUWHGWKDW$IULFDQ$PHULFDQRIILFHUVZHUHPRUH
likely to show concern for their well-EHLQJ´
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authority and their legitimacy.41 These safety concerns will be more likely to 
influence officer interactions with Black civilians since the stereotype of police 
racism will be more salient.
For Black individuals, racial anxiety is experienced as the fear of being 
victimized by police racism.  These concerns may influence their behaviors and 
MXGJPHQWVDVZHOODVWKHDWWULEXWLRQVWKH\PDNHDERXWDQRIILFHU¶VFRQGXFWGXULQJ
an interaction, creating expectations of harsh or discriminatory treatment, 
including the use of lethal force.42 These worries may result in Black individuals 
approaching police interactions with heightened suspicion and anxiety.43
During their interaction, these mutual anxieties increase the risk that officers 
will conduct a frisk and that force will be used unnecessarily.  Because of their 
anxieties, individuals may fidget and avoid eye contact.  Officers may interpret 
these behaviors as signs that the individual poses a threat.  In fact, police are often 
trained to interpret these behaviors as suspicious and potentially dangerous.44
Additionally, the officer may be acting in similar ways, thereby confirming the 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VFRQFHUQV WKDW WKHRIILFHU LV OLNHO\ WRharm him or her.  Furthermore, 
officers may enact command presence, as they are trained to do in the face of a 
possible threat.  This means that they will attempt to establish immediate control of 
a situation by exercising dominance.45 However, for people experiencing racial 
DQ[LHW\ WKH RIILFHU¶V EHKDYLRUZLOO FRQILUP WKHLU IHDUV RI RIILFHU UDFLVP DV WKH\
wonder why the officer is treating them in this aggressive manner.
Furthermore, when officers exhibit signs of racial anxiety or when they enact 
command presence, civilians may mirror their behaviors.46 This is known as the 
self-fulfilling prophecy or behavioral confirmation effect.  However, since officers 
will be unaware that their own behaviors played a role in generating the 
LQGLYLGXDO¶V EHKDYLRUV RIILFHUV PD\ LQWHUSUHW WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V DFWLRQV DV
confirmation that the individual is dangerous.

41 Phillip Atiba Goff et al., Illegitimacy Is Dangerous: How Authorities Experience and React 
to Illegitimacy, 4 PSYCHOLOGY 340, 343 (2013).
42 See generally TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC 
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND THE COURTS (2002).
43 See generally Duncan, supra note 18; Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, 
Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently 
Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979).
44 Richard R. Johnson & Mark A. Morgan, Suspicion Formation Among Police Officers: An 
International Literature Review, 26 CRIM. JUST. STUD. 99, 108 (2013).  See also Nick Jacobellis, How 
to Spot a Concealed Firearm, POLICE MAG. (Nov. 1, 2007), http://www.policemag.com/channel
/patrol/articles/2007/11/how-to-spot-a-concealed-firearm.aspx [https://perma.cc/7976-72VX].
45 Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”: Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops, and Police 
Training, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671, 674 (2009).  See also L. Song Richardson, Police Racial 
Violence: Lessons from Social Psychology, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2961, 2969 (2015); Phillip Atiba 
Goff et al., Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical Dehumanization, and Contemporary 
Consequences, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 292 (2008).
46 Gau & Brunson, supra note 40, at 269±70.
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Research confirms that racial anxiety can increase the likelihood that force 
will be used during an interaction.  In one study involving the police, researchers 
found that officers experience racial anxiety, regardless of their race.47 They also 
discovered that the experience of racial anxiety predicted uses of force against 
Black men.48 The more officers were concerned with appearing racist, the more 
likely they were to have used greater force against Black individuals, relative to 
individuals of other racial groups, in the previous two years.49
In conclusion, over four decades of research provide troubling evidence that 
LPSOLFLW UDFLDO ELDVHV FDQ LQIOXHQFH SHRSOH¶s judgments about and behaviors 
towards Black individuals.  These effects occur spontaneously and without 
conscious intention, and are not dependent upon whether people consciously 
endorse negative racial stereotypes or hold consciously racist attitudes.  
Furthermore, racial anxiety influences interactions in negative ways, affecting the 
behaviors and judgments of both parties to the interaction.  In the context of 
policing, implicit racial bias and racial anxiety can result in officers stopping, 
frisking, and using force more often against Black civilians than White civilians.  
This can occur even when officers are not consciously racist and Blacks are not 
engaged in criminal activity.  Next, this Essay will discuss how implicit racial bias 
and racial anxiety can influence police-public interactions and the implications for 
Fourth Amendment doctrine.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICING AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Both implicit racial bias and racial anxiety are relevant to police-public 
interactions and the Fourth Amendment doctrine that attempts to regulate them.  
Subpart A studies the problems with Terry, the case that sanctioned police stop-
and-frisk practices, demonstrating that the decision permits police to act on their 
racial hunches.  Subpart B exposes how Fourth Amendment doctrine enables 
negative interactions between the police and people of color, allowing officers to 
create a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in ways that sustain the 
stereotype of police racism.
A. Acting on Racial Hunches50
In Terry, the Court held that officers could detain individuals and conduct a 
limited frisk for weapons in the absence of probable cause that individuals were 

47 GOFF ET AL., PROTECTING EQUITY, supra note 39, at 3±5, 17.  The researchers use the term 
³VWHUHRW\SHWKUHDW´WRGHVFULEHZKDW,DPUHIHUULQJWRDVUDFLDODQ[LHty.
48 Id. at 11.
49 Id.
50 For an in-depth analysis of the discussion contained in this subpart, see Richardson, Arrest 
Efficiency, supra note 7.
82 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol. 15:73
armed and engaged in criminal activity.51 Instead, the decision authorizes officers 
to conduct stops DQG IULVNV DV ORQJDV WKH\FDQ³SRLQW WR VSHFLILF DQGDUWLFXODEOH
facts which . . . lead[] [them] reasonably to conclude . . . that criminal activity may 
EHDIRRW´52 and that the individual with whom they are interacting is armed and 
dangerous.53
The reasoQDEOHVXVSLFLRQWHVWZDVPHDQWWRVDIHJXDUGDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VULJKWWR
be free from unjustified invasions of their liberty and bodily integrity, while also 
giving police the ability to investigate suspicious people.  To protect individuals, 
the Court prohibiWHGRIILFHUV IURPDFWLQJRQ WKHLU ³LQFKRDWH DQGXQSDUWLFXODUL]HG
VXVSLFLRQ>V@ RU µKXQFK>HV@¶´ LQFOXGLQJ UDFLDO KXQFKHV54 Instead, the Court 
UHTXLUHG WKDWRIILFHUV³SRLQW WR VSHFLILFDQGDUWLFXODEOH IDFWV´ WR MXVWLI\ WKHTerry
stop.55 The Court cautioned WKDW ³>D@Q\WKLQJ OHVV ZRXOG LQYLWH LQWUXVLRQV XSRQ
constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than 
LQDUWLFXODWH KXQFKHV D UHVXOW WKLV &RXUW KDV FRQVLVWHQWO\ UHIXVHG WR VDQFWLRQ´56
Furthermore, the Court was concerned both with the negative perceptions of police 
that existed within communities of color and with the problem of racially targeted 
policing.57 This highlights the irony of what the Terry decision has produced.  
When the probable influence of implicit biases on police-public interactions is 
considered, it illuminates why the reasonable suspicion test cannot prevent 
intrusions based upon nothing more than racial hunches.58 Rather, the test 
facilitates policing that inadequately protects liberty while simultaneously failing
to further effective law enforcement.
)LUVW DV D UHVXOW RI LPSOLFLW ELDV RIILFHUV¶ DWWHQWLRQ ZLOO EH GUDZQ PRUH
quickly to Blacks than to Whites, even if officers are not engaged in conscious 
racial profiling. Once this occurs, officers will be more likely to evaluate the 
ambiguous behaviors of Black civilians as aggressive, violent, or suspicious.  
Meanwhile, the impact of implicit white favoritism will make it more difficult for 
officers to evaluate the identical behaviors of White individuals as potentially 
criminal, even if Whites captured their attention.  Rather, it would take more 
unambiguous evidence of criminality before officers will judge the behavior of 
Whites to be suspicious. Thus, implicit biases can result in police targeting, 
stopping, and searching Blacks more often than Whites, even in the absence of 
conscious racial bigotry on the part of officers and criminality on the part of 
individuals.

51 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30±31 (1968).
52 Id. at 21, 30.
53 Id. at 27.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 21.
56 Id. at 22.
57 Id. at 14 n.11.
58 Richardson, Arrest Efficiency, supra note 7, at 2059.
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6HFRQG ³>b]y allowing officers to act on their interpretation of ambiguous 
behaviors, the reasonable suspicion test actually permits, rather than prevents, 
DFWLRQV EDVHG XSRQ UDFLDO KXQFKHV´59 As a result, the standard insufficiently 
protects the Fourth Amendment rights of Blacks.  They will be stopped and frisked 
more often than similarly situated Whites, not because they are acting more 
suspiciously, but because implicit biases will impact how police interpret their 
ambiguous behaviors.60
To be sure, the reasonable suspicion test requires officers to justify their 
suspicions by articulating the facts that led them to feel suspicious.  However, this 
does nothing to prevent actions based on racial hunches arising out of implicit bias.  
Implicit bias is not only unconscious, but it is also a heuristic the brain uses to 
discern the meaning of information.  By its nature, implicit bias²WKH³VXVSLFLRQ
KHXULVWLF´²will always operate in the presence of other information, which will 
nearly always offer a neutral articulable basis for the suspicion.  Moreover, officers 
will not realize that their feelings were based on a racial hunch caused by the 
operation of implicit racial bias.  In other words, officers will not realize that if the 
individual they observed had been White, they may not have noticed the behavior 
or may not have interpreted it as indicative of potential criminality.  And, the 
record of their decisionmaking will not contain evidence permitting an outside 
observer to identify the racially influenced decisionmaking.
It is in this way that tKHHIIHFWRILPSOLFLWELDVRQWKHRIILFHU¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRn of 
ambiguous behaviors can be understood as an inarticulable racial hunch.  The 
RIILFHU¶VIHHOLQJVRIVXVSLFLRQZLOOQRWEHEDVHGXSRQVRPHREMHFWLYHO\VXVSLFLRXV
behavior that he or she would inevitably have considered suspicious regardless of 
the race of the person engaged in it.  Rather, his or her evaluation of the behavior 
as suspicious may be unintentionally influenced by unconscious, inarticulable 
racial biases²in other words, an unconscious racial hunch.61 Hence, the 
reasonable suspicion test fails to prevent the police from acting on their racial 
hunches and thus fails to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of Black civilians in 
a manner that is comparable to Whites.
Furthermore, there is every reason to believe that officers on the street²not 
just in the laboratory²are affected by implicit bias.  For one, simply thinking 
about crime can trigger unconscious racial biases.62 Additionally, officers 
primarily conduct stops and frisks in indigent, urban, majority-minority 
communities, and officers working in these environments exhibit higher levels of 
implicit bias than those who do not.63 Moreover, perceptions of disorder increase 
when a community is majority Black instead of majority White, even when the 

59 Id. at 2062±63.
60 Id. at 2075.
61 Id. at 2062.
62 Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black, supra note 11, at 876±77, 883.
63 Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line, supra note 20, at 1020.
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neighborhoods are otherwise similarly situated.64 Thus, an officer patrolling an 
indigent, urban, majority Black neighborhood is more prone to judge ambiguous 
behaviors as suspicious, causing him or her to stop more individuals who are 
innocent. Finally, implicit biases are most likely to influence judgments in 
situations where decisionmaking is highly discretionary, information is limited and 
ambiguous, and individuals are cognitively depleted.65 These are the conditions 
under which most police conduct stops and frisks.
Gathering more information and slowing down decisionmaking can mitigate 
the influence of these biases.66 However, the Terry doctrine encourages officers to 
DFW RQ WKHLU LQLWLDO VXVSLFLRQV XQGHU FLUFXPVWDQFHV ZKHUH DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V
appearance and demeanor, as well as the neighborhood they are located, are the 
main sources of information.  Exacerbating this situation is the training officers 
receive and the methods for evaluating their performance.  For at least the past 
decade, officers have been trained to resolve situations quickly.67 Moreover, 
officers are often evaluated based on how many stops and frisks they complete 
during their shift.68 Both of these factors create incentives for officers to make 
quick decisions based on incomplete information.  In sum, implicit biases can 
influence behaviors and judgments in systematic and predictable ways that can 
cause unjustified racial disparities and the Terry doctrine exacerbates their 
influence.
B. Fostering Negative Interactions and Constructing Reasonable Suspicion
Upon interpreting ambiguous behaviors as potentially criminal, officers will 
confront the individual to confirm or dispel their suspicions. When approaching 
the individual, racial anxiety may cause both officers and individuals to exhibit 
behaviors that are consistent with aggression.  The officer may interpret the 
SHUVRQ¶VEHKDYLRUDVHYLGHQFHWKDWWKHLQGLYLGXDOLVDUPHGUHVXOWLQJLQDQLQYDVLYH
and humiliating frisk.69 7KH LQGLYLGXDOPD\ LQWHUSUHW WKH RIILFHU¶V EHKDYLRUV DV
signaling that the officer poses a threat to their well-being.  Thus, during the 
LQWHUDFWLRQ HDFK ZLOO IHHG RII WKH RWKHU¶V DQ[LHW\ FDXVLQJ HDFK WR LQWHUSUHW WKH
RWKHU¶VDPELJXRXVEHKDYLRUVWKURXJKDELDVHGOHQVDQGLQFUHDVLQJWKHFKDQFHVWKDW
the interaction will escalate into the use of force.  Consideration of racial anxiety 

64 Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma 
and the Social Construction of “Broken Windows,” 67 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 319, 319±21, 336 (2004).
65 See, e.g., Eberhardt, Seeing Black, supra note 11, at 876.
66 Patricia G. Devine & Lindsay B. Sharp, Automaticity and Control in Stereotyping and 
Prejudice, in HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING, AND DISCRIMINATION 61, 72 (Todd D. Nelson 
ed., 2009).
67 POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON USE OF FORCE 5, 21±22 (2016).
68 See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
69 Richardson, Arrest Efficiency, supra note 7, at 2080.
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thus reveals how racial disparities in frisks and uses of force can occur even in the 
absence of bad actors on either side of the interaction.
Furthermore, although the reasonable suspicion test purports to cabin officer 
discretion by prohibiting officers from seizing individuals based on their inchoate 
suspicions of criminality, post-Terry doctrine allows officers to create the very 
reasonable suspicion that is meant to limit their behaviors.  The doctrine gives 
officers the ability to turn their racial hunches into reasonable suspicion to conduct 
a forcible seizure in the following way.  In theory, all people have the right to 
avoid police contact so long as police do not have reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause to restrict theiUIUHHGRPRIPRYHPHQW$VWKH&RXUWKDVDFNQRZOHGJHG³DQ
DWWULEXWHRISHUVRQDOOLEHUW\SURWHFWHGE\WKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ´LVWKH³ULJKWWRUHPRYH
IURP RQH SODFH WR DQRWKHU DFFRUGLQJ WR LQFOLQDWLRQ´70 However, this right is 
illusory, especially for Black individuals who live in urban, majority-minority 
communities.
If officers want to engage with individuals, and those individuals choose to 
exercise their right to avoid them, officers often find this behavior to be 
suspicious.71 In Michigan v. Chesternut, the Supreme Court made it clear that 
officers can pursue individuals who arouse their suspicions in this way without the 
necessity of reasonable suspicion or probable cause.72 In Chesternut, four officers 
in a patrol car decided to pursue Chesternut after he ran away upon observing 
them.73 Once they caught up to him, the officers drove alongside him for an 
unspecified amount of time.74 Eventually they developed probable cause to arrest 
him for drug possession.75
Chesternut challenged the police pursuit, arguing that it constituted a seizure 
unsupported by the requisite level of suspicion.  However, the Court held that no 
seizure had occurred.76 Instead, it concluded that:
[T]he police conduct involved here would not have communicated to the 
reasonable person an attempt to capture or otherwise intrude upon 
UHVSRQGHQW¶V IUHHGRPRIPRYHPHQW   :KLOH WKH YHU\ SUHVHQFH RI D
police car driving parallel to a running pedestrian could be somewhat 
LQWLPLGDWLQJ    >LW@ ZDV QRW ³VR LQWLPLGDWLQJ´ WKDW UHVSRQGHQW FRXOd
reasonably have believed that he was not free to disregard the police 
presence and go about his business.77

70 City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53 (1999) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted) 
(internal quotations omitted).
71 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring).
72 486 U.S. 567, 575±76 (1988).
73 Id. at 569.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 572±73.
77 Id. at 575±76 (citations omitted).
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Thus, the decision endorsed the practice of officers following individuals, 
either in their patrol car or on foot, based solely on a mere hunch of criminality.  
Because implicit bias increases the chances that officers will view the ambiguous 
behaviors of Blacks with more suspicion than identical behaviors engaged in by 
Whites, police pursuits of people in the absence of articulable suspicion are more 
likely to burden Black individuals than White individuals.  Furthermore, being 
pursued by the police, especially when they are exercising their right to avoid 
police contact, increases perceptions of police racism that contributes to racial 
anxiety.
Moreover, the Court also has limited the ability of certain groups to exercise 
their right to avoid police contact.  In Illinois v. Wardlow, officers were patrolling 
D³KLJKFULPHQHLJKERUKRRG´ LQ VHDUFKRIFULPLQDODFWLYLW\78 Upon noticing the 
police, Wardlow fled and officers pursued him.79 The Court held that flight upon 
noticing the police in a high crime neighborhood gives rise to a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity.80 7KLV LV WKH FDVH HYHQ LI SULRU WR WKH FLYLOLDQ¶V
flight, officers did not have the requisite suspicion to conduct a forcible seizure.  
Thus, in so-called high crime neighborhoods, officers can create a reasonable 
suspicion of criminality in order to act on their racial hunches simply by goading 
people into fleeing.  They can do this by engaging in aggressive shows of authority 
such as shouting at people to halt or using their lights and sirens to pursue 
individuals walking down the street.  The more aggressive they are, the more likely 
people might be to flee.  If they flee, then officers have successfully created 
reasonable suspicion to conduct a forcible seizure.  Thus, in high crime 
neighborhoods, officers can turn their inchoate hunches into reasonable suspicion 
to conduct a seizure simply by engaging in aggressive shows of force that scare 
people into fleeing.
This decision is more likely to affect Black individuals than White 
LQGLYLGXDOV)LUVW WKHSKUDVH³KLJKFULPHQHLJKERUKRRG´RIWHQLVQRWEDVHGXSRQ
empirical proof or other objective measures that a particular neighborhood is 
actually high in crime.  Rather, it is typically used to describe urban, majority-
minority neighborhoods.81 Second, as previously discussed, despite being 
similarly situated, majority Black neighborhoods are viewed as more disordered 
than majority White neighborhoods.82 Third, even without being goaded by the 
police, the history of racialized law enforcement gives Blacks much more reason to 
worry about being victimized by police racism and thus, to want to avoid police 
contact more than Whites have.  Thus, fleeing from police is completely consistent 

78 528 U.S. 119, 119 (2000).
79 Id. at 121.
80 Id. at 121, 123±24.
81 Lenese C. Herbert, Can’t You See What I’m Saying? Making Expressive Conduct a Crime 
in High-Crimes Areas, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL¶Y 135, 136 (2002).
82 Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 64.
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with innocence instead of guilt for Black individuals and other groups that have 
borne the brunt of stops and frisks and other similar proactive policing practices.
For many Black individuals, the constant stopping, questioning, and frisking 
of individuals within their communities is perceived as harassment, and foments 
distrust, anger, and other feelings not conducive to fostering good community-
police relationships or perceptions of police legitimacy.83 Empirical evidence 
consistently demonstrates that Black individuals bear the brunt of stops and frisks 
and other similar investigatory proactive policing practices.  For instance, they are 
disproportionately asked for consent to search and are disproportionately the 
subjects of canine sniffs after stops are made.84 As a result, people in these 
FRPPXQLWLHV RIWHQ YLHZ WKH SROLFH ³DV MXVW DQRWKHU JDQJ´85 These negative 
DWWLWXGHV DERXW ODZ HQIRUFHPHQW ³EHJLQ FU\VWDOOL]LQJ GXULQJ DGROHVFHQFH ZKHQ
youths have greater opportunities for direct and indirect contact with officers . . . .´86
Furthermore, distrust of the police can occur vicariously.  For instance, high school 
VWXGHQWV ³REVHUY>LQJ@RWKHU VWXGHQWV >EHLQJ@ VWRSSHGDQG WUHDWHGZLWKGLVUHVSHFW´
were less likely to trust police.87
As a result of Chesternut and Wardlow, the ability to avoid police contact is 
denied to the very Black individuals who have the most reason to believe that the 
police are racist²those living in indigent, urban, majority-minority neighborhoods 
overrun by police.  If they walk away, they can be followed and if they run away, 
they can be chased and forcibly restrained.  Thus, the implication of these 
decisions is that Black individuals do not have the same rights to avoid the police.  
Instead, they must submit or risk being pursued until they do.
Permitting officers to force interactions with Black individuals, primarily 
through shows of authority, exacerbates racial anxiety.  First, being followed or 
chased by the police, especially when they are not engaged in criminal activity, 
provides individuals with evidence to confirm the stereotype of police racism.88
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83 Richardson, Arrest Efficiency, supra note 7, at 2074; I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, 
and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 843 (2008).
84 Jeremy Gorner & Matthew Walberg, Cops Still Stopping More Black and Hispanic Drivers 
than Whites: ACLU, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 13, 2014, 8:25 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-
racial-profiling-traffic-stops-met-20140813-story.html [https://perma.cc/XD5F-CFFV].
85 David K. Shipler, Opinion, Living Under Suspicion, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 1997), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/07/opinion/living-under-suspicion.html [https://perma.cc/69NW-
AHBH].
86 Jamie L. Flexon et al., Exploring the Dimensions of Trust in the Police Among Chicago 
Juveniles, 37 J. CRIM. JUST. 180, 181 (2009).  See also Craig B. Futterman, Chaclyn Hunt & Jamie 
Kalven, Youth/Police Encounters on Chicago’s South Side: Acknowledging the Realities, 2016 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 125, 125±26 (2016).
87 Flexon et al., supra note 86, at 186.
88 As Justice Stevens noted in his Wardlow GLVVHQW ³>W@KH UHVHQWPHQW HQJHQGHUHG    LV
aggravated, not mitigated, if the offLFHU¶V HQWLUH MXVWLILFDWLRQ IRU WKH VWRS LV WKH EHOLHI WKDW WKH
individual is simply trying to avoid contact with the police or move from one place to another²as he 
RU VKH KDV D ULJKW WR GR DQG GR UDSLGO\´  ,OOLQRLV Y :DUGORZ  86   Q 00) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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Second, officers are more likely to use physical force against Black individuals 
after a chase.89 Then, the racially disparate uses of force that result solidifies the 
stereotype of police racism, creating a reinforcing cycle of distrust and suspicion.
IV. CONCLUSION
Consideration of implicit bias and racial anxiety highlights why it is highly 
unlikely if not impossible for stops and frisks to be conducted in a manner that 
does not result in unjustified racial disparities.  Instead, this practice decreases 
police-public trust and understanding, as well as community views of police 
legitimacy.  Additionally, the racial disparities in police judgments of suspicion 
and uses of force that can result from both implicit bias and racial anxiety reinforce 
%ODFN LQGLYLGXDOV¶ SHUFHSWLRQV WKDW WKH SROLFH DUH UDFLVW DQGSROLFH FRQFHUQV WKDW
they will be negatively stereotyped.  Furthermore, although the Terry Court 
expressly attempted to address the problem of distrust of the police in communities 
of color by permitting but regulating stops and frisks, the study of the Terry 
doctrine through the lens of implicit bias and racial anxiety demonstrates why that 
compromise was bound to fail.
In sum, the Terry doctrine facilitates a feedback loop of police-public 
suspicion and violence even when officers are consciously egalitarian and 
individuals are not engaged in criminal activity.  Ending this cycle will require 
more than simply exhorting officers to treat individuals with courtesy and respect 
during stops and frisks, although this should be encouraged so long as stops and 
frisks continue.  Rather, repairing the broken police-public relationship will require 
abandoning the practice.
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89 See Chris Mooney, The Science of Why Cops Shoot Young Black Men, MOTHER JONES
(Dec. 1, 2014, 11:00 AM), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/12/science-of-racism-pre
judice/ [https://perma.cc/UC27-TLGZ].
